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COMMENTS 
The Real Estate Investment Trust: State Tax, Tort, and 
Contract Liabilities of the Trust, Trustee, 
and Shareholder 
In 1960, after lying dormant for almost twenty-five years,1 the 
business trust2 suddenly became a subject of great interest as a re-
sult of the addition of the Real Estate Investment Trust Act3 to the 
Internal Revenue Code. Under the Act, a Real Estate Investment 
Trust (REIT), which is basically a business trust that meets certain 
specified qualifications,4 does not have to pay any federal tax on the 
portion of its capital gains and ordinary income that it distributes 
to its shareholders during or with respect to the taxable year.'1 
Since the passage of the Act, as could be expected, there have 
been a large number of REITs formed, 6 and a great number of 
articles written about them.7 However, almost all of these articles 
I. This period of dormancy began with the landmark case of Morrissey v. Commis-
sioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), in which the Supreme Court held that Massachusetts trusts 
were taxable as corporations, changing the earlier rule expressed in Crocker v. Malley, 
249 U.S. 223 (1919). 
2. Also known as a common-law trust or Massachusetts trust, defined by the Supreme 
Court as 
[a form] of business organization, common in that State [Massachusetts], consisting 
essentially of an arrangement whereby property is conveyed to trustees, in accor-
dance with the terms of an instrument of trust, to be held and managed for the 
benefit of such persons as may from time to time be the holders of transferable 
certificates issued by the trustees showing the shares into which the beneficial in• 
terest property is divided. 
Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 146-47 (1924). 
3. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 856-58, effective for taxable years beginning after Dec. 
31, 1960. 
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 856(a), 856(c), 857(a). See text accompanying notes 10-21 
infra. 
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 857(b). 
6. There are presently 174 real estate investment trusts registered with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. Letter from the Securities and Exchange Commission to the 
Michigan Law Review, Nov. 28, 1972. 
7. E.g., Dockser, Real Estate Investment Trusts: An Old Business Form Revitalized, 
17 U. MIAMI L. REv. 115 (1962); Jones, Business Trusts in Florida-Liability of Share-
holders, I4 FLA. L. REv. 1 (1961); Kahn, Taxation of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 48 
VA. L. REv. 1011 (1962); Kelley, Real Estate Investment Trusts After Seven Years, 23 
Bus. LAw. 1001 (1968); Kilpatrick, The Taxation of Real Estate Investment Trusts and 
Their Shareholders, 39 TAXES 1042 (1961); Roberts, The Real Estate Investment Trust-
New Tax-Saving opportunity for Investors, U. So. CAL. 1961 TAX INST. 27; Sobieski, 
State Securities Regulation of Real Estate Investment Trusts-The Midwest Position, 
48 VA. L. REv. 1069 (1962); Weissman, The Common Law of Business Trusts, 38 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 11 (1961); Weissman, A New Look at Business Trusts, 49 !LL. B.J. 744 
(1961); Comment, The Real Estate Investment Trust: Legal and Economic Aspects, 24 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 155 (1969); Note, The Real Estate Investment Trust-Arkansas Con-
siderations, 24 .ARK. L. REv. 453 (1971); Note, The Real Estate Investment Trust-Past, 
Present, and Future, 23 U. Pl1T. L. REv. 779 (1962); Note, Liability of Shareholders in 
a Business Trust-The Control Test, 48 VA. L. REv. 1105 (1962), See also Selected Ma-
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have dealt with the federal tax aspects of REITs; only a few have 
investigated problems encountered in dealing with state statutes 
and case law on business trusts. 8 The current posture of state law 
in this area is confused despite the passage of twelve years since the 
adoption of the Real Estate Investment Trust Act. Indeed, it has 
been noted that many investors are reluctant to purchase REIT 
shares because they believe that investment in a REIT entails the 
assumption of liabilities under state law-particularly for debts and 
torts of the REIT-to a greater extent than investment in a cor-
poration. 9 
This Comment will attempt to alert potential investors in and 
trustees of REITs to the full extent of the liabilities that they could 
suffer for contract debts incurred in the name of the trust and torts 
committed by trust personnel. Since state tax considerations also 
play a significant role in investment decisions, the manner in which 
each state taxes the REIT and its shareholders on income derived 
from property and business in that state will also be investigated. 
Finally, a rational path out of the morass created by current state 
law will be articulated in order to prompt renewed discussion in 
Congress and in the state legislatures and courts on a cogent policy 
for dealing with the liabilities of the REIT, its trustees, and its 
shareholders. 
l. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
To obtain the special tax treatment afforded by the Real Estate 
Investment Trust Act, a business must fulfill a number of qual-
ifications. It must be an unincorporated trust or unincorporated 
association,1° be managed by one or more trustees, 11 have its bene-
ficial ownership evidenced by transferable shares,12 be the type of 
entity that would ordinarily be taxable as a domestic corporation 
but for the REIT provisions of the Code,13 and be owned by at 
least one hundred persons.14 It cannot be a business that would be 
a personal holding company if all of its adjusted ordinary gross in-
terials on Real Estate Investment Trusts and Real Estate Syndication, 27 R.EcoRD OF 
N.Y.C.B.A. 537 (1972). 
8. E.g., Jones, supra note 7; Weissman, 38 Cm.-KENT L. R.Ev. 11, supra note 7; Weiss-
man, 49 ILL. B.J. 744, supra note 7; Note, 24 ARK. L. R.Ev. 453, supra note 7; Note, 48 
VA, L. R.Ev. 1105, supra note 7. 
9. H.R. REP. No. 481, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965). 
IO. INT. R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 856(a). 
11. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(l). 
12. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(2). 
13. lr-.T. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(3). 
14. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(5). 
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come were personal holding company income,15 and it cannot hold 
any property primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of 
its trade or business.16 It must distribute to its shareholders at least 
ninety per cent of its taxable ordinary income.17 
In addition, a business entity must meet certain requirements 
as to sources of income and diversification of assets in each taxable 
year in which it seeks to qualify as a REIT. It must derive: 1) at 
least ninety per cent of its gross income from dividends, interest, 
rents from real property, gain from the sale or other disposition 
of stock, securities, and real property (including interests in real 
property), and abatements and refunds of real property taxes;18 2) at 
least seventy-five per cent of its gross income from its passive real 
estate investments and from abatements and refunds on real prop-
erty;19 3) less than thirty per cent of its gross income from the sum 
of its short-term capital gains on stock or securities and its gains 
from the sale of real property held less than four years.20 At the 
close of each quarter of its taxable year, at least seventy-five per cent 
of its total assets must be represented by real estate assets, cash, and 
government securities, with the remaining twenty-five per cent, if 
invested in securities, limited to not more than ten per cent of the 
outstanding voting securities of any one issuer.21 
If an entity can meet all these qualifications, it can serve, in 
essence, as a conduit, with its distributed income ta.xed only once 
-when it gets into the hands of its shareholders.22 As something 
of a quid pro quo, shareholders may not treat any distributions of 
ordinary income from the REIT as dividends for purposes of the 
one hundred dollar dividends-received exclusion23 or the eighty-five 
per cent dividends-received deduction applicable to corporate share-
holders.24 
15. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(6). "Adjusted ordinary gross income" is defined 
by section 543(b )(2). 
16. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(4). 
17. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 857(a)(l). 
18. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(2). 
19. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(3). 
20. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(4). 
21. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(5). 
22. It is obvious that to someone who prefers investments in entities that distribute 
a large proportion of their income this conduit treatment is a great advantage, for the 
REIT's income is taxed only once, while at least ninety per cent of such income is dis-
tributed. To an investor in a high tax bracket, who would prefer that the entity retain 
a large proportion of its income so that the stock would appreciate in value, such an 
arrangement is not particularly advantageous. However, since Congress was concerned 
with the small investor, see text accompanying notes 25-28 infra, this Comment will 
refer to the tax treatment afforded to RElTs as a tax "advantage." 
23. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 116(b)(3). 
24. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 243(c)(3). 
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By granting tax advantages to REITs, Congress intended to en-
courage the growth of REITs in order to increase the funds avail-
able for equity financing of the large real estate developments and 
redevelopments needed in metropolitan areas.25 Moreover, in rec-
ognition of the shortage of private capital and mortgage money, 
Congress sought to encourage investment in real estate by a broad 
spectrum of the public and to stimulate the flow of money for homes, 
apartment houses, office buildings, factories, and hotels from sources 
other than the traditional government-guaranteed loans and loans 
from insurance companies, pension funds, and other financial in-
stitutions.26 Finally, it intended to afford the opportunity to small 
investors to participate in large scale, expertly managed real estate 
ventures, in which only a few wealthy individuals had previously 
been capable of investing.27 A similar opportunity had been afforded 
since 1936 to small investors in regulated investment companies, 
commonly known as mutual funds, with respect to income from 
stocks and bonds.28 
In addition to favorable tax treatment, the REIT offers many 
other advantages to the small investor who wishes to invest in real 
estate. It is said to be a hybrid29 between the two other forms of 
organization that have been used for investment in real estate-the 
corporation and the partnership30-offering the best of each and 
the worst of neither. Like a corporation,31 the REIT offers cen-
tralized management and free transferability of shares as well as, in 
25. H.R. REP. No. 2020, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1960). 
26. Id. at 4. 
27. Id. at 3-4. 
28. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 851-55. 
This secures for the trust beneficiaries the same type of tax treatment they would 
receive if they held the real estate equities and mortgages directly and, therefore, 
equates their treatment with that accorded investors in regulated investment com-
panies . 
• • . [I]n both cases the methods of investment constitute pooling arrangements 
whereby small investors can secure advantages normally available only to those with 
larger resources. These advantages include the spreading of the risk of loss by the 
greater diversification of investment which can be secured through the pooling 
arrangement; the opportunity to secure the benefits of expert investment counsel; 
and the means of collectively financing projects which investors could not under-
take singly • 
. . • [Y]our committee believes it is also desirable to remove taxation to the 
extent possible as a factor in determining the relative size of investment in stocks 
and securities on one hand and real estate equities and mortgages on the other. 
H.R. REP. No. 2020, supra note 25, at 3-4. It should be noted that some commentators 
feel that, although the reasons given by Congress for the passage of this tax advantage 
may have validity, the real reason for its passage was the effective lobbying of several 
business trusts from Massachusetts. Kahn, supra note 7, at 1016; Zarrow, Tax Aspects, 
in REAL EsTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS II, at 41, 43 (Practising Law Institute 1970). 
29. Oklahoma Fullers Earth Co. v. Evans, 179 Okla. 124, 125, 64 P.2d 899, 901 (1937). 
30. See generally Annot., 156 A.L.R. 22, 30-52 (1945). 
31. H. HENN, CORPORATIONS 96 (2d ed. 1970). 
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most states, limited liability for shareholders.32 All this is offered, 
of course, without the double taxation that distributed corporate 
income must bear.83 In this respect, the REIT is like a partnership, 
for partnership income is taxed only to the partners and not to the 
partnership itself.84 However, a partnership has several character-
istics not shared by the REIT. First, participation in a partnership 
is limited to those selected by the individual partners for their per-
sonal qualifications,85 and the death or notice of withdrawal of a 
partner signals the dissolution of the partnership;36 a REIT is open 
to investment by the public, and it continues to exist despite the 
death or withdrawal of a trustee or shareholder.37 Moreover, in most 
states38 the beneficiaries of a REIT are not personally liable for the 
debts of the business as are the general partners of a partnership.39 
Finally, REITs have the potential to attract more investors than 
partnerships engaged in real estate investment, for several reasons. 
First, unlike partnerships, REITs can offer freely transferable shares. 
Furthermore, REITs generally sell their shares at cheaper prices 
than real estate partnerships offer.4° Finally, REITs are generally 
more diversified in their investments than partnerships.41 
It is apparent then, that, both in terms of organizational form 
and federal tax status, the REIT has much to offer certain investors.42 
However, in order to draw any final conclusions on the relative at-
tractiveness of this type of investment, it is necessary to ascertain 
the consequences currently imposed by state law on investment in 
this type of pusiness. 
II. CONTRACT LlABILITIES 
A. REIT Trustees 
It is well settled that the officers, directors, and other employees 
of corporations are not personally liable on corporate contracts so 
32. See text accompanying notes 58-67 &: 73-76 infra. 
33. Kelley, supra note 7, at 1004. Indeed, real estate investment and development 
corporations, which must pay corporate taxes, have been largely confined to investments 
offering high depreciation relative to cash yield in order to avoid double taxation. Id. 
at 1002. 
34. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 701. 
35. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, PARTNERSHIP § 5(c) (1968). 
36. Id.§ 73. 
37. H. HENN, supra note 31, at 91. 
38. See text accompanying notes 58-67 infra. 
39. H. HENN, supra note 31, at 55-57. 
40. Real estate syndicates, the most common form of real estate partnerships, usu-
ally sell shares ranging in price from 1,000 to 10,000 dollars each. Kelley, supra note 7, 
at 1004. 
41. Partnerships typically only invest in one or two properties and thus expose the 
investor to many more risks. Comment, supra note 7, at 168. 
42. Those who desire large dividend returns on their invested capital rather than 
capital gains income. See note 22 supra. 
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long as they are acting in their representative capacities.43 The law 
regarding liability of REIT trustees, however, is not so well settled. 
Although a few states have statutes stating that the trustee is not 
personally liable for such contracts,44 most of the law in this area is 
judge-made. Almost universally, courts have held that the trustee 
of a business trust is personally liable for contractual obligations 
incurred on behalf of the trust.45 This result is explained on the 
following ground: 
A trustee is not an agent. An agent represents and acts for his 
principal, who may be either a natural or artificial person. A trustee 
may be defined generally as a person in whom some estate, interest, 
or power in or affecting property is vested for the benefit of another. 
"When an agent contracts in the name of his principal, the principal 
contracts and is bound, but the agent is not. "When a trustee contracts 
as such, unless he is bound, no one is bound, for he has no principal. 
The trust estate cannot promise; the contract is therefore the personal 
undertaking of the trustee.46 
However, most of the cases dealing with the liability of the 
trustees have involved attempts to limit that liability in the declara-
tion of trust and in contracts between the trust and third parties. 
In such cases, the courts have generally stated that the mere addi-
tion of the word "trustee" or "as trustee" to the trustee's signature 
on a contract is insufficient to effect a limitation of liability.47 It has 
been held, however, that a trustee can be relieved of personal lia-
bility by a clause in the trust instrument, provided that the state's 
43. See, e.g., Alberts v. Schneiderman, 182 S.2d 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); First 
Natl. Bank of Hopkins v. International Mach. Corp., 279 Minn. 188, 156 N.W .2d 86 
(1968). See generally H. HENN, supra note 31, at 96. 
44. ALA. CODE tit. 58, § 29(3) (Supp. 1972); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2206A (1965) 
(business trust instrument may relieve the trustee from liability); MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 78C, § 4 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 318.02 (1969); Mrss. CODE ANN. § 5570-05(c) 
(Supp. 1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 174 (1971) (read in conjunction with Hauser v. 
Catlett, 197 Okla. 668, 173 P.2d 728 (1946)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 52-204 (1962) (business 
trust instrument may relieve the trustee from liability); S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 47-
14-10 (1969); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6138A (1970) (REIT trustees only); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 16-12-6 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-350(1) (1966). 
45. E.g., Andrews v. Horton, 8 Cal. App. 2d 40, 47 P .2d 496 (1935); Austin v. Parker, 
317 Ill. 348, 148 N.E. 19 (1925); Weber Engine Co. v. Alter, 120 Kan. 557, 245 P. 143 
(1926); Philip Carey Co. v. Pingree, 223 Mass. 352, Ill N.E. 857 (1916); J.P. Webster &: 
Sons v. Utopia Confectionary, 254 S.W. 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923), overruled by TEx. 
REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6138A (1970) (for REITs only). For additional cases in these 
and other states, see 3 G. BOGERT, TRusrs &: TRUSTEES § 300 (2d ed. 1964); Annot., supra 
note 30, at 162 n.42 (1945); contra, H. Kempner v. Welker, 36 Ariz. 128, 283 P. 284 
(1929); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. North, 320 Ill. App. 221, 50 N.E.2d 434 (1943); 
Hamilton v. Young, ll6 Kan. 128, 225 P. 1045 (1924). 
46. Taylor v. Davis' Admrx., IIO U.S. 330, 334-35 (1884). See also McGovern v. Ben-
nett, 146 Mich. 558, 109 N.W. 1055 (1906). 
47. E.g., Philip Carey Co. v. Pingree, 223 Mass. 352, Ill N.E. 857 (1916);· Larsen v. 
Sylvester, 282 Mass. 352, 185 N.E. 44 (1933). See generally 3 G. BOGERT, supra note 45, 
§ 300; H. HENN, supra note 31, at 89; Annot., supra note 30, at 164. 
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statutory law makes the clause effective.48 However, most courts 
have held that a third party who has not been given notice of such 
a clause is not bound thereby and can subject the trustee to per-
sonal liability.49 Even in some states that do not by statute make 
such trust instrument clauses effective, courts have concluded that 
liability can be successfully limited by the insertion of a provision 
in contracts with third parties that the trustees shall not be per-
sonally liable and that the creditors agree to look solely to the trust 
for the satisfaction of their obligations.50 
The liability of the trustees is a personal obligation, and execu-
tion on judgments secured by trust creditors may be levied upon 
personal assets of the trustee. In the absence of statute, only when 
such assets are not available is there a possibility that relief will be 
given in equity against the trust estate.51 However, if the trustees 
acted within their authority in undertaking the obligation and have 
paid it from their personal assets, states that have considered the 
matter have concluded that the trustees have a right to indemnity, 
first from the trust income, and if that is insufficient, then from the 
trust corpus.52 However, if the obligation was incurred without au-
thority, or arose from negligent or willful conduct for which the 
48. Hamilton v. Young, 116 Kan. 128, 225 P. 1045 (1924); Dunning v. Gibbs, 213 
Ky. 81, 280 S.W. 483 (1926); Boyle v. Rider, 136 Md. 286, 110 A. 524 (1920); Shoe &: 
Leather Natl. Bank v. Dix, 123 Mass. 148 (1877); William Lindeke Land Co. v. Kalman, 
190 Minn. 601, 252 N.W. 650 (1934); George v. Hall, 262 S.W. 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). 
49. E.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Goldberg, 143 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1944); Gold• 
water v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 292 P.2d 624 (1930); Linn v. Houston, 123 Kan. 409, 255 
P. 1105 (1927); Downey Co. v. 282 Beacon St. Trust, 292 Mass. 175, 197 N.E. 643 (1935); 
Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Wallace, 346 Pa. 532, 31 A.2d 
71 (1943); Continental Supply Co. v. Adams, 272 S.W. 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), over-
ruled by TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6138A (1970) (for REITs only). For additional 
cases in these and other states, see Annot., supra note 30, at 173 n.85. See also Hilde• 
brand, Liability of Trustees, Property, and Shareholders of a Massachusetts Trust, 2 
TEXAS L. REv. 139, 165 (1924). 
50. E.g., Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 292 P. 624 (1930); Schumann-Heinle v. 
Folsom, 328 Ill. 321, 159 N.E. 250 (1927); Hamilton v. Young, 116 Kan. 128, 225 P. 1045 
(1924); Rand v. Farquhar, 226 Mass. 91, 115 N.E. 286 (1917); William Lindeke Land 
Co. v. Kalman, 190 Minn. 601, 252 N.W. 650 (1934); Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives &: 
Granting Annuities v. Wallace, 346 Pa. 532, 31 A.2d 71 (1943); Shelton v. Montoya Oil &: 
Gas Co., 292 s.w. 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1804(2) 
(1964). For additional cases from these and other states, see Annot., supra note 30, at 
165-66 nn.59-61. Cf. Weber Engine Co. v. Alter, 120 Kan. 537, 245 P. 143 (1927). 
51. 3 G. BOGERT, supra note 45, §§ 300, 302. Of course, this may not be true where 
there is a clause in a third-party contract excluding personal and including estate lia-
bility. See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra. Moreover, a number of states have 
gotten around this common-law rule by statutes permitting suit against the trust in 
its own name. MINN, STAT. ANN.§ 318.02 (1969); N.Y. GEN. AssNs. LAw §§ 13 (McKinney 
Supp. 1972), 15 (McKinney 1942); 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 182 (1960); S.C. CoDE 
ANN. § 52-204 (1962); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 226.14(11) (Supp. 1972). See generally 3 G. BO-
GERT, supra, § 302 n.59. 
52. Downey Co. v. 282 Beacon St. Trust, 292 Mass. 175, 197 N.E. 643 (1935) (dictum); 
Connally v. Lions, 82 Tex. 664, 18 S.E. 799 (1891). See generally H. HENN, supra note 
31, at 89-90; Hildebrand, supra note 49, at 155; Annot., supra note 30, at 142. 
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trustee is personally responsible, there is no right to reimburse-
ment.li3 
If the trust estate is insufficient to make the trustee whole when 
he has discharged a liability properly incurred in the administra-
tion of the trust, the issue arises whether he may obtain reimburse-
ment from the beneficiaries.li4 The only case that can be found on 
point, Darling v. Buddy,li5 denied the trustee of a business trust the 
right to recover from the beneficiaries an amount he had paid toward 
a debt that he had contracted for the trust. The court analyzed the 
case in terms of certain general legal principles applicable to busi-
ness trusts: that third parties may not hold persons liable as part-
ners in an enterprise in the absence of a consensual partnership 
arrangementli6 and that the trustee is a principal rather than the 
agent of the beneficiaries. 57 Therefore, since third parties could not 
hold the beneficiaries personally liable for the debts the trustee had 
contracted, the court concluded that the trustee could not obtain 
indemnification from the beneficiaries for payment of such debts. 
B. REIT Shareholders 
Corporate shareholders generally have no liability for the cor-
poration's contracts.58 A few states have statutes that insulate busi-
53. Rubens v. Costello, 75 Ariz. 5, 251 P.2d 306 (1952); Sykes v. Parker, 250 Ill. App. 
299 (1928); Winslow v. Young, 94 Me. 145, 47 A. 149 (1900); Dunham v. Blood, 207 Mass. 
512, 93 N.E. 804 (1911); McFadden v. Leeka, 48 Ohio St. 513, 28 N.E. 874 (1891). See 
generally Annot., supra note 30, at 142. 
54. Some commentators have stated that the trustee may or should be able to obtain 
reimbursement. H. HENN, supra note 31, at 90; Scott, Liabilities Incurred in the Ad-
ministration of Trusts, 28 HARV. L. REv. 725, 728 (1915); Symmonds, Business Trusts, 
15 MARQ. L. REv. 211, 215-16 (1931). However, their statements are based on an old 
English case, Hardoon v. Belilios, [1901] A.C. 118, which really is not on point. The 
case held that a trustee who had been found personally liable on a debt of the trust 
could get reimbursement directly from the trust beneficiary since the trust assets were 
not enough to cover the payment. However, the trust involved there was not a business 
trust, but a standard trust; moreover, there was only one beneficiary who owned the 
entire beneficial interest in the property held in trust. The court emphasized that the 
latter fact was extremely important in its decision, [1901] A.C. at 124, and implied that 
had there been several beneficiaries, as there are in the case of a REIT, it would not 
have decided the case the same way. Finally, the beneficiary in Hardoon demanded from 
the trustee all the income from the trust property and paid all calls upon the price of 
the property, [1901] A.C. at 126-27. Thus, although legal title to the trust property 
was not in the beneficiary's name, he assumed all the benefits and burdens of ownership. 
55. 318 Mo. 784, 1 S.W.2d 163 (1927). 
56. 318 Mo. at 795, 1 S.W.2d at 167. 
57. 318 Mo. at 799, 1 S.W.2d at 170, 
58. H. HENN, supra note 31, at 96. Under modern corporation laws, shareholders do 
have liability where they exercise the role of directors; in addition, in some states if 
they treat corporate assets as their own, undercapitalize the entity, or lead creditors to 
believe they will be personally responsible for corporate debts, they will be held liable 
for such debts. See id. at 250-59. 
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ness trust shareholders from personal liability for the trust's contract 
debts;59 no state has a statute that provides otherwise. 
However, there seems to be a division in the state case authority 
dealing with this problem. The majority view is that shareholders 
of a business trust will not incur personal liability for the trust's debts 
so long as there is a separation of management from beneficial own-
ership in the trust.60 However, the states that adhere to the majority 
view generally impose personal liability on the beneficiaries when 
they exercise sufficient control over trust affairs to make the trustees 
their agents.61 What constitutes "control" in any given case is a mat-
ter of £act. For example, where the only power given to the trust 
beneficiaries is the power to elect trustees annually, the beneficiaries 
are usually not held to control trust affairs.62 On the other hand, 
control has been found where the beneficiaries are given some com-
bination of the powers to remove the trustees, to fill the vacancies, 
to amend the declaration of trust, and to prevent the sale of real 
estate.63 
A minority of courts have held that business trust shareholders 
are vulnerable to unlimited liability for trust debts regardless of 
59. ALA. CODE tit. 58, § 29(4) (Supp. 1971); Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-509 (Supp. 
1972); CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 23001 (West Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 609.07 (Supp. 
1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-4-1-2 (1972) (trust instrument may provide for limited lia-
bility of shareholders); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-2035 (1964); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:49l(B) 
(Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 78C; § 4 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § lll8.02 (1969); 
Miss. CODE ANN. § 6570-07 (Supp. 1972); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 15-2505 (Supp. Vol. 2, 
1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 174 (1971) (read in conjunction with Hauser v. Catlett, 
197 Okla. 668, 173 P.2d 728 (1946)); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 52-204 (1962) (declaration of trust 
which limits personal liability of beneficiary is binding); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 47-
14-10 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1804(4) (1964); TIDC. REV. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 6138A 
(1970) (REIT shareholders only); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-12-5 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 6.1-350 (1966); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 423.90.020 (1959). 
60. Betts v. Hackathorn, 159 Ark. 621, 252 S.W. 602 (1923); Goldwater v. Oltman, 
210 Cal. 408, 292 P. 624 (1930); Levy v. Nellis, 284 Ill. App. 228, 1 N.E.2d 251 (1936); 
Greco v. Hubbard, 252 Mass. 37, 147 N.E. 272 (1925); Rossman v. Marsh, 287 Mich. 720, 
286 N.W. 83 (1939); Darling v. Buddy, 318 Mo. 784, 1 S.W .2d 163 (1927). For additional 
cases from these and other states, see Annot., supra note 30, at 107 n.15. 
61. Betts v. Hackathorn, 159 Ark. 621, 252 S.W. 602 (1923); Goldwater v. Oltman, 
210 Cal. 408, 292 P. 624 (1930); Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 328 Ill. 321, 159 N.E. 250 
(1927); Williams v. Inhabitants of Milton, 215 Mass. 1, 102 N.E. 355 (1913); Darling , •• 
Buddy, 318 Mo. 784, 1 S.W.2d 163 (1927); Brown v. Bedell, 263 N.Y. 177, 188 N.E. 641 
(1934). For additional cases from these and other states, see Annot., supra note 30, at 
112 n.28. 
62. Gutelius v. Stanbon, 39 F.2d 621 (D. Mass. 1930); Levy v. Nellis, 284 Ill. App. 
228, 1 N.E.2d 251 (1936); Home Lumber Co. v. Hopkins, 107 Kan. 153, 190 P. 601 (1920); 
Hamilton v. Young, 116 Kan. 128, 225 P. 1045 (1924); Darling v. Buddy, 318 Mo. 784, 
1 S.W .2d 163 (1928). 
63. Howe v. Chmielinski, 237 Mass. 532, 130 N.E. 56 (1921); Goubeaux v. Kricken-
berger, 126 Ohio St. 302, 185 N.E. 201 (1933); But see Commissioner v. City of Spring• 
field, 321 Mass. 31, 71 N.E.2d 593 (1947). That it is extremely hard to draw lines or effect 
general rules in this area is amply demonstrated by the discussion of cases in Annot., 
supra note 30, at 114-19. 
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control.64 In most of these states, this result follows from the fact 
that the business trust is not recognized as an entity. 65 
Finally, in a fairly substantial number of states there simply is 
no statutory or case law concerning this problem.66 Whether bene-
ficiaries of a business trust are liable for the debts of the trust in 
those states is apparently still a matter of conjecture.67 
III. TORT LIABILITIES 
The trustees of a business trust, like corporate officers and direc-
tors, 68 are personally liable for their own torts, including those com-
64. Reilly v. Clyne, 27 Ariz. 432, 234 P. 35 (1925), overruled by Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 10-509 (Supp. 1972) (for REIT shareholders); McClaren v. Dawes Elec. Sign & Mfg. Co., 
86 Ind. App. 196, 156 N.E. 584 (1927), modified by IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-5-1-2 (1972) (trust 
instrument may provide for limited liability of shareholders); Linn v. Houston, 123 
Kan. 409, 255 P. 1105 (1927), overruled by KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2035 (1964) (for REIT 
shareholders); Ing v. Liberty Natl. Bank, 216 Ky. 467, 287 S.W. 960 (1926); American 
Natl. Bank v. Reclamation Oil Producing Assn., 156 La. 652, IOI S. 10 (1924), overruled 
by LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:49l(B) (Supp. 1972) (for REIT shareholders); Thompson 
v. Schmitt, 15 Tex. 53, 274 S.W. 554 (1925), overruled by TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. 
art. 6138A (1970) (for REIT shareholders). 
One author suggests that at least two policy arguments can be mustered in favor 
of holding the shareholders personally liable: I) business trust shareholders make their 
investments with profits in mind, so it is only fair that they should be responsible for 
the venture's debts; 2) such a policy solves the problem of deciding in each and every 
case whether the amount of control exercised is enough to warrant liability. Jones, 
supra note 7, at 23-24. 
65. H. HENN, supra note 31, at 88. In Arizona, Kansas, and Louisiana, a trust is 
regarded as a corporation and failure to comply with corporation laws results in the 
imposition of individual liability upon the shareholders. In Kentucky and Indiana a 
business trust is held to be a partnership for purposes of imposing personal liability. 
In Texas a business trust is treated as a joint stock company, and shareholders bear 
personal liability. See authorities cited in note 64 supra. 
The legal status of the business trust in Washington is currently unclear. Recent 
legislation has been passed which offers recognition to the business trust and which 
recognizes the trust's ability to immunize its shareholders from personal liability to 
third persons. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 23.90.010-.900 (1961). However, since the 
business trust was previously regarded as invalid in Washington under an interpretation 
of the state constitution, State ex rel. Range v. Hinkle, 126 Wash. 581, 219 P. 41 (1923), 
the constitutionality of the enabling statute would appear to be open to serious ques-
tion. 3 z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 43.08[3] (1972). 
Kentucky and Washington may be the only states where shareholders of a REIT 
may still be personally liable for the contracts of the REIT, for Arizona, Indiana, 
Kansas, Louisiana, and Texas all have statutes now that specifically exempt shareholders 
of a REIT, although not necessarily of any business trust, from personal liability. See 
authorities cited in note 59 supra. 
66. Alaska; Colorado; Connecticut; Delaware; Georgia; Hawaii; Idaho; Iowa; Maine; 
Nebraska; Nevada; New Hampshire; New Mexico; North Carolina; Oregon; Pennsyl-
vania; Vermont; West Virginia; Wisconsin; Wyoming. 
67. However, Colorado, Iowa, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, \Viscon-
sin, and Wyoming are members of the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association, 
whose Statement of Policy Regarding Real Estate Investment Trusts attempts through 
the regulation of the sale of REIT shares to make limited liability of REIT share-
holders the norm. See notes 123-26 infra and accompanying text. 
68. H. HENN, supra note 31, at 456-57. 
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mitted in furtherance of the trust's business.69 In addition, they are 
personally liable for torts committed in the course of trust business 
by the agents and employees of the trust.70 It has been held that 
such employees are the servants or agents of the trustees and not of 
the beneficiaries so that liability cannot be shifted to the share-
holders. 71 However, one case has held that, at least where the deed 
of trust provides that the trustees shall not be liable for the torts 
of agents or employees of the trust, any judgment entered against 
the trustees on account of such torts shall be paid out of the trust 
estate.72 
The tort liabilities of the shareholders of a business trust follow 
much the same pattern as their contract liabilities. Like corporate 
shareholders, who normally incur no liability for the torts of cor-
porate personnel,78 business trust shareholders generally are not 
personally liable for the torts of the trustees or trust employees 
even though committed in furthering the trust's business.7i Those 
few states that have statutes in this area generally provide that busi-
ness trust shareholders are to enjoy the same limited liability as 
shareholders of a corporation.75 However, once shareholders begin 
to exercise control over the trustees, every state that has considered 
the problem has held that they are personally liable for torts com-
mitted by the trustees in the furtherance of the trust's business.76 
It should be pointed out that even if a state decides that the 
trustees or shareholders of a Real Estate Investment Trust should 
be liable for torts committed by REIT trustees or employees, as a 
69. Sleeper v. Park, 232 Mass. 292, 122 N.E. 315 (1919); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. 
art. 6138A (1970) (REIT trustee liable for wilful torts, malfeasance, or negligence only); 
UTAH CoDE ANN. § 16-12-6 (Supp. 1971) (same as Texas). See 3 G. BOGERT, supra note 
45, § 300. Contra, ALA. CODE tit. 58, § 29(3) (Supp. 1971); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5570-05(c) 
(Supp. 1972); 2 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS 1540 (1939). 
70. Falardeau v. Boston Art Students Assn., 182 Mass. 405, 65 N.E. 797 (1903); Prinz 
v. Lucas, 210 Pa. 620, 60 A. 304 (1905). See 3 G. BOGERT, supra note 45, § 300. 
71. Falardeau v. Boston Art Students Assn., 182 Mass. 405, 65 N.E. 797 (1903). 
72. Prinz v. Lucas, 210 Pa. 620, 60 A. 309 (1905). 
73. H. HENN, supra note 31, at 403-05. 
74. No cases have been found in which a business trust shareholder has been held 
liable for torts of the trust in the absence of control of the trustee by the shareholder. 
75. ALA. CODE tit. 58, § 29(4) (Supp. 1972); Aruz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 10-509 (Supp. 
1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 609.07 (Supp. 1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-5-1-2 (1972) (trust 
instrument may provide for limited liability of shareholders); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2035 
(1964); LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 12:49l(B) (Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 78C, § 4 (1969); 
Miss. CODE ANN. § 5570-07 (Supp. 1972); MoNT. R.Ev. CODES ANN. § 15-2505 (Supp. Vol. 2, 
1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 174 (1971) (read in conjunction with Hauser v. Catlett, 
197 Okla. 668, 173 P.2d 728 (1946)); s.c. CODE ANN. § 52-204 (1962); S.D. COMP. LAws 
ANN. § 47-14-10 (1969) (clause in declaration of trust declaring limitation of liability of 
shareholders is binding); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1804(4) (1964); TEX. R.Ev. Crv. STAT. 
ANN. art. 6138A, § 8 (1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-12-5 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-350 
(1966); WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN.§ 23.90.020 (1959). 
76. Piff v. Berresheim, 405 Ill. 617, 92 N.E.2d 113 (1950); Marchulonis v. Adams, 97 
W. Va. 517, 125 S.E. 340 (1924). See generally 3 G. BOGERT, supra note 45, §§ 294-97. 
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practical matter such torts are likely to occur only rarely. The re-
cent trend has been toward the formation of mortgage trusts,77 
which limit their investments to mortgages and other income-pro-
ducing liens against real property. The income of these trusts is 
derived primarily from interest earned and discounts received dur-
ing the period of amortization of the mortgages.78 It is difficult to 
conceive of many situations in which an employee of an organiza-
tion whose sole business is the buying and selling of mortgages might 
commit a tortious act resulting in injury to a member of the public. 
It seems more likely that an employee of an equity REIT would 
have occasion to cause personal injury by engaging in tortious con-
duct since equity REITs invest primarily in the mmership of real 
property, such as shopping centers, industrial properties, and apart-
ment buildings, which are frequently open to the public.79 Even for 
trustees and shareholders of an equity trust, however, there is little 
likelihood of being held liable to a member of the public given the 
requirements of the Internal Revenue Code that REIT investments 
be passive. To qualify for the tax advantages provided by the Real 
Estate Investment Trust Act an equity trust must hire an indepen-
dent contractor to manage and operate its real property.80 If a mem-
ber of the public is injured on the REIT's property, it is highly 
probable that the injury will have been caused not by an employee 
of the REIT but by an employee of the independent contractor. 
77. Augustine, Introduction to Real Estate Investment Trusts, in REAL EsrATE IN-
VESTMENT TRUSTS II, at 11-12 (Practising Law Institute 1970). 
78. Kelley, supra note 7, at 1002. The mortgages may be long term or short term. 
Long-term mortgages are acquired as part of a "permanent" portfolio. Short-term 
mortgages for construction and other forms of interim financing, which generate a 
higher rate of return than the long-term mortgages, are included in the portfolio 
in order to increase the earning power of the mortgage trust. Id. 
79. Id. These trusts have invested almost exclusively in commercial and industrial 
rental real estate, usually subject to mortgages or other incumbrances, and their 
primary source of income is from rents. 
80. Section 856(d)(!I) of the Code excludes from "rents from real property" any 
amount received with respect to real property if the trust "furnishes or renders 
services to the tenants of such property, or manages or operates such property, 
other than through an independent contractor from whom the trust itself does 
not derive or receive any income • • • ." Under this test, if upon audit it is 
deemed that the trust received one dollar for services to one or more tenants in 
a building generating $100,000 in annual rents, none of the income from that 
property will be deemed "rents from real property" and, if more than 10% of 
gross income, the trust will be disqualified. These restrictions are a part of the 
legislative scheme aimed at limiting the benefits of the real estate investment 
trust provisions to trusts which are passive investors in real estate. This par-
ticular subsection requires the trusts to engage an independent contractor . . . 
for the purpose of I) furnishing or rendering services to the tenants and 2) 
managing or operating the real property. 
Kelley, supra note 7, at 1006. Trustees must manage the trust but may not manage 
or operate the trust property. REIT trustees can I) establish rental terms; 2) 
choose tenants; 3) enter into and renew leases; 4) "deal with" taxes, interest, and 
insurance relating to tenants' property; 5) make capital expenditures; and 6) make 
decisions about repairs and pay their cost. TREAS. R.Ec. § 1.856-4(d) (1962). 
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Under traditional agency principles, one who hires an independent 
contractor is not liable for the actions of that contractor's employ-
ees. 81 Thus, even if a state decides that REIT trustees or share-
holders should be liable for the torts of REIT employees, the 
incidence of such liability in practice will be rare. 
IV. EVALUATION OF CURRENT LAW AND 
POTENTIAL AVENUES TO REFORM 
It is apparent that there are many states where the law on REITs 
is either uncertain or unfavorable and many others where there is 
no law at all on the questions of tort and contract liability of REIT 
trustees and shareholders. It was for these reasons that the House 
Ways and Means Committee concluded in 1965 that the use of 
REITs had not been so extensive as had been anticipated when the 
Real Estate Investment Trust Act was passed in 1960. As the Com-
mittee stated: 
Real estate investment trusts have not been used as widely since 1960 
as might have been anticipated from the type of tax treatment made 
available, primarily because of the requirement in the 1960 provision 
that the organization itself must be "an unincorporated trust or an 
unincorporated association." 
In some of the States, the trust form of organization for real estate 
investments is not workable or, at best, the law is uncertain .... Even 
·with [recent amendments in a few states to ·allow investment in pas-
sive real estate investment trusts], however, the application of the law 
in the case of real estate investment trusts generally remains uncer-
tain, because the law of governing unincorporated trusts has been 
highly developed in only a relatively few States . 
. . . [I]t has been found that many investors are reluctant to invest 
in trusts, because they do not understand their method of operation. 
Many believe that when they invest in trusts they are assuming lia-
bilities and responsibilities to a greater extent than when they invest 
in a corporation. Thus, there appears to be a feeling that trust shares 
or certificates are not a suitable form of general investment.82 
A uniform, predictable legal approach to the liabilities of REIT 
trustees and shareholders would do much to stimulate the formation 
of and investment in REITs, which was Congress' purpose in en-
acting the Real Estate Investment Trust Act.83 Attempts to achieve 
the desired uniformity and predictability might take one of three 
forms: adherence by states to a uniform conflict of laws principle 
with respect to REITs, enactment by Congress of federal legislation, 
or adoption by states of new or revised substantive law on REITs. 
81. See generally w. SEAVEY, AGENCY §§ 6, llE, 82, 84 (1964). 
82. H.R. REP. No. 481, supra note 9, at 3. 
83. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra. 
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These approaches will be surveyed and evaluated in the discussion 
that follows. 
A. Conflict of Laws 
It might seem, from the outset, that any fears trustees and share-
holders have about possible contract and tort liabilities could be 
allayed by forming the trust in a state that would not hold them 
so liable. For example, a REIT could file its declaration of trust in 
Massachusetts, where trustees may be relieved of liability for busi-
ness trust contracts and torts by clauses in the trust instrument or 
in contracts with third parties84 and where shareholders are not liable 
for REIT torts or contracts. 85 The trustees and shareholders would 
then be protected by Massachusetts law if state courts adhered to a 
conflict-of-laws principle that the law of the state of formation gov-
erns disputes involving REIT trustees and shareholders. Such a con-
filct principle would be analogous to the traditional principle 
applicable to corporations: the local law of the state of incorporation 
is applied to determine the existence and extent of a shareholder's 
liability to the corporation for assessments or contributions and to 
its creditors for corporate debts,86 and to determine the existence 
and extent of a director's or officer's liability to the corporation, to 
its creditors, and to its shareholders.87 That analogous principles 
might be applicable to REITs is recognized by the Restatement of 
Conflict of Laws, which states that to the extent other forms of 
organization, specifically the business trust, enjoy the same attributes 
as business corporations, the choice of law rules set out in the chapter 
on business corporations should be applicable to them.88 
However, it cannot be assumed at present that every state court 
will apply the local law of the state of formation in determining 
whether to hold REIT trustees or shareholders liable for REIT 
torts and debts. First, there are no traditional conflict-of-laws rules 
applicable to business trusts. The Resiatement says that, to date, 
84. E.g., Downey Co. v. 282 Beacon St. Trust, 292 Mass. 175, 197 N.E. 643 (1935); 
Rand v. Farquhar, 226 Mass. 91, 115 N.E. 286 (1917); Shoe & Leather Natl. Bank v. 
Dix, 123 Mass. 148 (1877). 
85. E.g., Commissioner v. City of Springfield, 321 Mass. 31, 71 N.E.2d 593 (1947); 
Greco v. Hubbard, 252 Mass. 37, 147 N.E. 272 (1925); Falardeau v. Boston Art Stu-
dents Assn., 182 Mass. 405, 65 N.E. 797 (1903). 
86. R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLicr OF LA.ws § 307 (1971). 
87. Id. § 309. 
88. Id., Introductory Note to ch. 13. 
That most people who form REITs feel these conflict rules will be applied to 
REITs is strongly suggested by the great number of REITs, no matter where their 
headquarters are located, that are formed in Massachusetts. Out of 112 REITs listed 
in MOODY'S INVEsrOR SERVICE, INC., BANK AND FINANCE MANUAL 1311-1592 (1972), 48 
were formed in Massachusetts; another 25 were formed in California, Maryland, and 
Texas, all of which are friendly to REIT trustees and shareholders. 
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forms of organization other than the corporation and partnership 
"have engaged the attention of the courts only rarely in the field 
of choice of law."89 Moreover, the Restatement position is that the 
choice-of-law rules applicable to corporations should apply to busi-
ness trusts, but only to the extent that the latter enjoy the same 
attributes as business corporations.90 The most important attribute 
of a business corporation, according to the Restatement, is limitation 
of the liability of the shareholder for any act or omission of the 
corporation.91 Since it has not been universally held that shareholders 
of a business trust are not liable for the acts or omissions of the 
trust92 and since, indeed, the case at bar might concern the very 
issue of whether to hold a shareholder liable for such acts, it cannot 
be stated with any certainty that every court will apply the corporate 
choice-of-law rules in litigation involving a Real Estate Investment 
Trust. Finally, the Restatement recognizes an exception to the tra-
ditional choice of law rules applicable to corporations: with respect 
to the particular issue whose resolution necessitates a choice of law, 
if some state other than the state of incorporation has a more sig-
nificant relationship to the parties and the transaction, a court will 
apply the law of the other state.93 Thus, even if a court should decide 
to apply corporate choice-of-law rules to a controversy involving a 
REIT, it would not necessarily use the substantive law of the state 
of formation to resolve that controversy. 
If a court decides that corporate conflict rules do not apply to 
REITs, it will be faced with deciding which state's laws should be 
applied to determine the extent of REIT trustee and shareholder 
liability. In one analysis of REITs, the authors stated: "The essen-
tial question is whether a state court will select the law of the forum, 
the law of the REIT's property situs or the law of the state of REIT 
origin."94 To this list could be added the law of the state where the 
contract was signed or was to be performed, the law of the state 
where the tort occurred, the law of the state where the REIT carries 
on most of its business, and the law of the state where the REIT has 
its· headquarters.95 
89. RESTATEMENT, supra note 86, Introductory Note to ch. 13. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. See text accompanying notes 58-67 8: 73-76 supra. 
93. RESTATEMENT, supra note 86, §§ 6, 309. 
94. T. ALLEN 8: W. DERRICK, REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS A-40 (107-2d, Ta.x 
Management, 1972). 
95. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to examine all the factors that a state 
should consider in deciding in each case which of these laws should apply, or to 
discuss how various theories on conflict of laws promoted by various commentators 
would approach this specific problem. See Comment, Limited Liability of Share-
holders in Real Estate Investment Trusts and the Conflict of Laws, 50 CALIF. L 
REv. 696 (1962); Note, The Real Estate Investment Trust in Multistate Activity, 48 
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It should be noted that even if a court does not apply the law 
of the state of REIT formation and chooses the law of the forum 
or of some other state, there are few states whose law is particularly 
harsh on REIT trustees or shareholders. If a REIT simply avoided 
formation or investment in these few states, it could minimize the 
chance that their unfavorable law would ever be applied in a case 
in which the liability of the REIT's shareholders or trustees is at 
issue. 
Up to this point, however, attention has not been given to the 
situation in which a court decides that the law to be applied to 
determine trustee or shareholder liability in a particular case is that 
of a state that has no law at all on the subject. In such a situation, 
the court will have to guess what the other state would hold on the 
matter of trustee or shareholder liability. Logically, the court might 
conclude that the other state would adopt the majority opinion 
among states that have considered the problem. This conclusion 
would result in nonliability for both the shareholders and trustees 
if the trust instrument and third-party contracts contain clauses that 
provide for such nonliability. However, there is no certainty that a 
court would so decide. 
The absence of firm conflict rules with respect to business trusts 
creates an atmosphere of uncertainty for REIT trustees and share-
holders. Just as it is generally recognized that a uniform and predict-
able treatment of corporations is desirable and that a single body of 
law should govern a corporation's operations to the extent possible,96 
so does the resurgence of the business trust raise the need for a rea-
sonably predictable legal environment.97 Probably the easiest way to 
achieve a uniform result in this area is for a state always to apply the 
law of the state where the trust was formed in determining trustee 
and shareholder liability. This solution would allow the trustee anq 
shareholder to know their potential liabilities from the very incep-
tion of the undertaking. It would eliminate the need, which more 
complex choice-of-law rules would create, to decide on the facts of 
each and every case which state's substantive law should apply.98 Un-
VA. L. R.Ev. 1125 (1962). See generally, e.g., D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE·OF-LAW PROCESS 
(1965); A. VON MEHREN &: D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS (1965); 
Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DuKE LJ. 171; 
Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law: Current Doctrine and "True Rules", 49 CALIF. L. REv. 
240 (1961); Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Pro-
fessor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 463 (1960); Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restate-
ment Second, 28 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 679 (1963); Traynor, Is This Conflict Really 
Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657 (1959). 
96. See A. BADR, ALIEN CORPORATIONS IN CONFLICT OF LAws 89 (1953); 2 E. RABEL, 
CONFLICT OF LAws 3 (1947). 
97. Comment, supra note 95, at 701. 
98. For example, if a state decided that the conflict rule to be applied to business 
trusts were the rule of most significant contacts, it would then have to decide which 
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der the proposed solution, a REIT, which is in practically every 
respect like a corporation, 99 would be treated as a corporation. Fi-
nally, this solution would reflect the result reached by most of the 
business trust cases involving conflict of laws.100 
A possible qualification to this solution is that a court might em-
ploy the doctrine that the law of another state cannot be applied 
if it contravenes the public policy of the forum state.101 Under this 
doctrine, a forum might decide that it should not apply the law of 
the state of formation in litigation involving a REIT. However, 
such decisions should be rare. A statute of another state is not con-
trary to the forum state's public policy merely because the forum 
has no statute on the subject,102 nor is a public policy conflict created 
by a mere variance between the law of another state and that of the 
forum.1oa 
However, unless and until the conflict-of-laws rule suggested 
above is adopted by all of the states with which a REIT, its trustees, 
and its shareholders have connections, the risk remains that one of 
those states might apply the law of a state other than the state of 
formation and hold the trustee or shareholders liable for contracts 
or torts of the REIT. For a large REIT with holdings, trustees, and 
shareholders in many states this risk could be substantial. It seems 
apparent, then, that sufficient uniformity and certainty in the area 
of REIT trustee and shareholder liabilities cannot be achieved, at 
least in the immediate future, unless Congress alters the require-
ment that REITs be business trusts or states reform their business 
trust laws. 
B. Possible Congressional Action 
While potential investors in real estate could avoid any possi-
bility of personal liability by operating in corporate form rather than 
as a REIT, corporations do not qualify for the special tax treatment 
given to REITs. The Internal Revenue Code specifically provides 
contacts of the particular REIT before it were "significant" and to which state they 
related .. This might be difficult in the case of a large REIT holding property or 
mortgages in many states, 
99. See text accompanying note 114 infra. 
100. E.g., Gutelius v. Stanbon, 39 F.2d 621 (D. Mass. 1929); Dunning v. Gibbs, 213 
Ky. 81, 280 S.W. 483 (1926) (dictum); Marchulonis v. Adams, 97 W. Va, 517, 125 S.E. 
340 (1924). See generally Comment, supra note 95; Note, supra note 95, at 1137-48. 
101. See, e.g., Means v. Limpia Royalties, 115 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ, App. 1938); 
Farmers' &: Merchants' Natl. Bank v. Anderson, 216 Iowa 988, 250 N.W. 214 (1933) 
(applying forum law to exonerate beneficiary). 
102. E.g., Warner v. Florida Bank &: Trust Co., 160 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1947); 
Ciampittiello v. Campitello, 134 Conn. 51, 54 A.2d 669 (1947). 
103. E.g., Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 108, 109 P.2d 701 (1941); Broderick v. 
McGuire, 119 Conn. 83, 174 A. 314 (1934). See generally Paulsen &: Sovern, "Public 
Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLUM, L. REv. 969 (1956). 
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that to qualify, a business must be either an unincorporated trust or 
an unincorporated association.104 
The problem of potential REIT trustee and shareholder liability 
could be alleviated if Congress were to amend section 856 of the 
Internal Revenue Code to allow corporations to qualify as REITs. 
Congress could state that if a corporation met all the requirements 
as to sources of income and diversification of assets that are set down 
in sections 856-58 of the Code, it would not be taxed on any of its 
income that it distributed to shareholders as long as it distributed 
at least ninety per cent of its net income. Such a plan would come 
much closer to equalizing the treatment between shareholders in 
mutual funds and the shareholders in Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
an express goal of Congress in passing the Real Estate Investment 
Trust Act.105 Presently, mutual funds also must meet rigid asset and 
income requirements and distribute at least ninety per cent of their 
income in order to avoid federal taxation of amounts that they dis-
tribute to shareholders;106 unlike REITs, however, they are corpo-
rations and thus can guarantee limited liability to their shareholders, 
a guarantee that REITs cannot make at present. The proposed plan 
would not hinder the encouragement of investment in real estate, 
which Congress tried to foster in 1960;107 indeed, it might encourage 
even more real estate investment, for many small investors who have 
been afraid of the potential liabilities associated with the business 
trust form might be attracted to real estate investment corpora-
tions.108 
An attempt was in fact made in 1965 to amend the Real Estate 
Investment Trust Act so that corporations could qualify as REITs 
and be eligible for the tax advantages granted such entities. The bill, 
H.R. 4260,109 would have provided that real estate investment cor-
porations that met the conditions specified in the statute now ap-
plicable to real estate investment trusts would be eligible for "pass 
through" tax treatment if ninety per cent or more of their income 
were distributed to shareholders.110 Although the bill was endorsed 
104. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a). 
105. H.R. REP. No. 2020, supra note 25, at 3. 
106. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 851-55. 
107. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra. 
108. H.R. REP. No. 481, supra note 9, at 3. As the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee stated in 1965, after considering such a plan as has just been discussed: 
[There is] no logical reason for granting regulated investment type treatment to 
real estate trusts and not to similarly situated real estate corporations. Moreover, 
making this treatment available to such real estate investment corporations would 
be particularly helpful to the small investor who has little understanding of the 
operations of trusts and who, therefore, would otherwise be unlikely to obtain a 
holding in any real estate parcel of relatively large maguitude. 
Id. 
109. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). 
llO. The bill also would have amended the present requirement that the business 
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by the House Ways and Means Committee111 and passed unani-
mously by the House of Representatives,112 it apparently died in 
the Senate Finance Committee. No hearings were ever held in the 
Senate on the bill, it was never reported out of the Committee, and 
no legislative history can be found on the bill after it left the House 
floor. 
No new movement to pass such an amendment has risen in Con-
gress since that time. Thus, while the problem of REIT shareholder 
and trustee liability could easily be solved by Congress' allowing 
corporations to qualify as REITs, there is no indication that Con-
gress is going to pass such an amendment, at least in the immediate 
future. The present problem of uncertain liabilities thus devolves 
upon the individual states for solution. 
C. Possible State Action 
In determining to what extent liability for REIT torts and debts 
should be imposed on the trustees and shareholders, states can find 
little guidance in the congressional history of the Real Estate Invest-
ment Trust Act. There is nothing in the Congressional Record, in 
the Committee report accompanying the REIT Bill,118 or in any 
other source that indicates what, if anything, Congress intended in 
regard to such liabilities when it passed the original Act. Only one 
bit of legislative history suggests that Congress has even considered 
this problem: As noted above, when the House Ways and Means 
Committee endorsed the 1965 bill that would have allowed corpo-
rations to qualify for REIT status, it did so on the ground that the 
bill, by assuring small investors limited liability, would encourage 
them to invest in real estate ventures. However, the Senate's failure 
to act on the bill leaves unclear what inferences might be drawn 
from the bill's history about Congress' intentions. 
I. Contractual Liability 
In deciding whether to hold the trustee or shareholder liable for 
the contracts of a REIT, a state should probably look first to the 
law that is applied to the corporation, the entity most similar to the 
REIT. In fact, the business corporation and the REIT are virtually 
identical in their formal characteristics: I) each has centralized man-
agement; 2) each is formed for the purpose of carrying on some kind 
be managed by one or more trustees and provided an alternative to the effect that 
the corporation could be managed by persons who bore a comparable fiduciary re-
lationship to the shareholders as do REIT trustees to the beneficial owners of the 
trust. H.R. REP. No. 481, supra note 9, at 3-4. 
111. Id. at 3. 
112. 111 CONG. R.Ec. 13964 (1965). 
113. H.R. REP. No. 2020, supra note 25. 
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of commercial activity for profit; 3) beneficial interests in the assets 
of each are evidenced by freely transferable certificates; and 4) the 
existence or life of each is not affected by the death, disability, or 
retirement of a shareholder, or by the sale or transfer of his inter-
est.114 Since corporations and REITs are alike in so many respects, 
it would seem logical to hold that if corporate shareholders and of-
ficers are not personally liable for the contracts of their corporation, 
then their counterparts-the REIT shareholders and trustees-
should not be held personally liable for the debts of the Real Estate 
Investment Trust. 
However, there is one major difference between a REIT and a 
corporation: a corporation is a legal entity or artificial person distinct 
from the shareholders who own it, 115 while a REIT is not. Indeed, 
it is because the corporation assumes obligations as a legal entity that 
shareholders have not been held personally liable for corporate con-
tracts and other debts.116 Moreover, the corporation's status as a legal 
person allows the principles governing the liability of agents to third 
persons to be applied in the corporate setting, with the result that 
officers have not been held personally liable on corporate contracts 
executed by them.117 Thus, since a REIT is not an independent legal 
entity like a corporation, it is arguable that the corporate analogy 
does not really apply. 
Although this distinction is cogent on its face, it is not persuasive 
when practical considerations are examined. So long as the REIT 
creditor is in no worse position than the corporate creditor, the fact 
that a REIT is not a legal entity is irrelevant. Since corporate officers 
and shareholders are normally immune from liability for the corpo-
ration's debts, a corporate creditor's recovery will generally be lim-
ited to the assets of the corporation.118 A state could put the REIT 
creditor in the same position as the corporate creditor by imposing 
personal liability on the trustee for REIT contracts while limiting 
the creditor's recovery to the value of the REIT assets, by permitting 
the trustee to reimburse himself from those assets, and by immuniz-
II4. Caplin, Foreword, 48 VA. L. REY. 1007 (1962). 
A famous business trust case carried the analogy even further: The corpus of the 
trust corresponds to the capital of the incorporated company; the trustees to the board 
of directors; the beneficiaries to the stockholders; the beneficial interests to shares of 
stock; and the declaration of trust to the charter. Schumann-Heink. v. Folsom, 328 Ill. 
321, 325-26, 159 N.E. 250, 252 (1927). 
Historically, the application of trust principles to the conduct of commercial enter-
prise originated in Massachusetts as a result of the inability to secure corporate char-
ters for acquiring and developing real estate without a special act of the legislature. 
Caplin, supra, at 1007. 
ll5. 13 A. FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 6213 (1961). 
116. Id. 
117. 3 id. § lll7 (1931). 
118. See text accompanying notes 43 &: 58 supra. 
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ing REIT shareholders from liability except in situations where 
corporate shareholders would be liable. A similar way to accomplish 
the same end would be to hold that neither the trustee nor the share-
holder shall be personally liable for REIT debts but that the REIT 
per se can be sued in the courts of the state. Suits directly against the 
trust have in fact been allowed in a few states,119 This solution, how-
ever, may prove too radical for states that cannot conceive of an 
unincorporated organization being sued in its own name. 
From a practical standpoint, the scheme of holding the trustee 
liable to the extent of REIT assets for REIT contracts would allow 
the average shareholder, who has no real control of the daily opera-
tions of the REIT, to be free from liability. It would subject the 
persons most closely identified with the everyday operations of the 
trust-the trustees-to responsibility for the contracts they under-
take without burdening them with debts that are not imposed on 
their corporate counterparts. Finally, under the proposed scheme the 
creditor of a REIT would be just as well off as a creditor of a corpo-
ration, for he could recover up to the full amount of the REIT's 
assets.120 A creditor who desired more security could ask the trustee 
to sign the contract and guarantee it in his own name, just as a corpo-
rate creditor who wants to be assured of a recovery that exceeds the 
extent of corporate assets can ask for a corporate officer's personal 
guaranty. Thus, the proposed scheme would treat like entities alike, 
assure uniformity and certainty, and abate the fears of potential in-
vestors, without affecting the availability of the federal tax advantage 
given to the Real Estate Investment Trust form. 
119. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 182 (1960); WIS, STAT. ANN. § 226.14(11) 
(Supp. 1973). See also G. BOGERT, supra note 45, § 302 n.59. 
120. To qualify for federal pass-through tax treatment, a REIT must distribute at 
_least 90 per cent of its income. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 857(a)(l). In contrast, a cor• 
poration generally retains a greater percentage of its income. In the aggregate, Ameri• 
can corporations have distributed slightly over 50 per cent of their profits after taxes 
in recent years. 93 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL .ABSTRAcr OF THE UNITED 
STATES r,tv. Lerner ed. 1972). While this difference in distribution patterns might seem 
to create a disparity in the assets available to satisfy creditors of REITs and corpora• 
tions, there are several factors that mitigate this apparent disparity. First, the REIT 
only distributes 90 per cent of its income that is left after all current liabilities have 
been met. Furthermore, equity REITs by definition invest in real property, which 
appreciates in value, see text accompanying note 79 supra, whereas corporations gen• 
erally invest in assets that depreciate in value. Although mortgage REITs, see text 
accompanying notes 77-78 supra, do not invest directly in appreciable assets, the mort• 
gages they hold are secured by real property. The only situation in which a mortgage 
REIT might be unable to pay its creditors would be that in which many of its mort-
gagors defaulted on their payments. In such a situation, the REIT or its creditors 
could foreclose on the underlying real property. Finally, most of the creditors of 
REITs are banks and other financial institutions. See generally Robertson, Sorting Out 
the Real Estate Investment Trusts, FORTUNE, Aug. 1970, at 173-75; Schulkin, Real Estate 
Investment Trusts: A New Finandal Intermediary, NEW ENGLAND EcoN, REv., Nov-Dec. 
1970, at 2. It could be expected that such institutions generally will not lend money to 
a REIT unless they are assured that its assets will be sufficient to pay back the loan. 
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2. Tort Liability 
A state must also consider whether a trustee should be personally 
liable for the torts of a fellow trustee or of personnel he has hired 
to carry on the trust's business, and whether a shareholder should be 
personally liable for such REIT torts. The solution that was sug-
gested in the area of contract liability would seem equally appro-
priate here: that the trustee shall be personally liable for the torts 
of the REIT's employees but only to the extent of the REIT assets; 
that the trustee shall be permitted to reimburse himself from the 
trust assets; and that the shareholders shall not be liable except in 
the situations in which corporate shareholders would be liable. This 
would leave all the parties in the same relative position as their cor-
porate counterparts. 
The decision whether to hold REIT shareholders or trustees lia-
ble for REIT torts is not a serious problem for two reasons. First, 
as noted above, torts by REIT trustees or employees are likely to 
occur infrequently.121 Second, public liability insurance can be ob-
tained at relatively little expense to cover potential trustee and share-
holder liability.122 
121. See notes 77-81 supra and accompanying text. 
122. Telephone conversation of February 15, 1973, with Mr. Lawrence London, 
United Underwriters, Cleveland, Ohio. 
Insurance may render obsolete some of the traditional common-law arguments that 
have been offered in favor of or against holding the trustees or shareholders liable for 
REIT torts. For example, it could be argued that imposing liability on a trustee for 
the torts of people he has hired to carry on the trust's business would tend to encourage 
a trustee to make sure that his fellow trustees and employees exercise caution in the 
execution of the trust's business. This is one of the justifications that have been given 
for respondeat superior in the law of agency. See W. SEAVEY, supra note 81, § 83. In 
addition, such liability might also cause the trustee to be much more selective in his 
hiring of employees. See id. Insurance, by insulating the trustee from personal loss, 
might weaken the effect of liability on the trustee's conduct. Two other reasons are 
generally given to justify respondeat superior: 1) the "deep pocket" theory, under 
which it is assumed that the master is more likely to be able to pay an injured person 
than the employee who injured the person, and 2) the "spread the loss" theory, under 
which it is assumed that the principal can more easily spread the cost of paying the 
injured person, through raising prices, than can the employee. See generally Calabresi, 
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). 
In the absence of insurance, the "deep pocket" theory might not be particularly 
applicable to a REIT trustee, who may have limited personal assets. The "spread the 
loss" theory is likely to be unaffected by the availability of insurance. 
With respect to the liability of a REIT shareholder for the torts of employees, it 
could be argued that shareholders invest in REITs to make a profit and that it is only 
fair that they be prepared to suffer some losses. Insurance would insulate shareholders 
from personal loss arising out of the REITs' operations. Another argument for share-
holder liability is that it will provide another source of assets for people who are injured 
by employees of the undertaking. However, so long as the REIT trustee carries maxi-
mum insurance, there is no need for another source of assets. On the other hand, two 
reasons are generally given to justify the limited liability of corporate shareholders: 
1) it encourages industry by allowing incorporated enterprises to avoid the expense of 
fully funding their enterprise, and 2) it makes it easier for corporations to offer their 
shares to the public. See Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts 
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Another approach to the problem of liabilities for REIT torts 
and contracts is offered by the Midwest Securities Commissioners 
Statement of Policy Regarding REITs.123 This Statement was issued 
by the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association, an association 
of the securities administrators of twenty-four states,124 and was in-
tended to be a model for state regulation of the sale of REIT shares. 
It requires, among other things, that the declaration of trust provide 
that the shareholder shall not be personally liable for any of the 
obligations of the trust, that all written contracts to which the trust 
is a party provide that the shareholders and beneficial owners shall 
not be liable thereon, and that the trustees maintain adequate in-
surance against possible tort liability on the part of the trust.125 How-
ever, the Statement is not an effective solution to the problem, for 
it merely regulates the sale of securities in a state and does not alter 
the state's general tort or contract law. Moreover, because the State-
ment requires that substantial powers be given to shareholders, adop-
tion of the Statement in states employing the control test might 
actually increase the incidence of shareholder liability.126 
V. TAX LIABILITIES 
A. Liabilities of Nonresident REIT Shareholders for 
Income Tax of State Where REIT Owns Property 
One contemplating investment in a REIT, in addition to being 
cognizant of potential personal liability for the contracts and torts 
of REIT personnel, must also be aware that he might have to pay 
of Their Corporation?, 76 YALE L.J. ll90, ll95-98 (1967). These arguments, which would 
apply equally to REITs and REIT shareholders, may carry less weight if potential 
investors knew they could protect themselves from liabilities arising from a corpora-
tion's operations by procuring insurance. 
123. l CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 1f1f 4751-57 (1969). 
124. Arizona; Arkansas; California; Colorado; Idaho; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kansas; 
Kentucky; Michigan; Minnesota; Missouri; Nebraska; New Mexico; North Dakota; Ohio; 
Oklahoma; South Dakota; Texas; Utah; Washington; Wisconsin; Wyoming. 1 CCH 
BLUE SKY L. REP. 1[ 4751 (1969). 
125. I CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. ,r 4754 (1969). The Statement also attempts to con-
trol such matters as the manner of election of trustees and amendments of the declara-
tion of trust. In addition, it imposes limitations upon expenses and prohibits certain 
types of investments and the issuance of securities of more than one class. Id. 
126. The trustee or trustees may be removed by the vote or written consent of 
two thirds of the outstanding shares of beneficial interest, changes can be made in 
the declaration of trust or other instruments forming the trust with the vote or 
written consent of two thirds of the outstanding shares, and the trust may be ter-
minated at any time by a vote or the written consent of two thirds of the outstanding 
shares. 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 1f 4754 (1969). Under the control test applied to 
business trusts, if a shareholder had a combination of these powers, he was deemed to have 
control of the trust and was held liable for its debts. See cases cited in note 63 supra. 
The Midwest Statement is not binding, either in whole or in part, on any of the 
individual member states of the Association unless it is expressly adopted or followed 
by the individual state. Indeed, very few of the member states have in fact adopted 
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income taxes to every state in which the REIT owns real estate. 
The statutes of states that impose a personal income tax contain, in 
some form, provisions that a nonresident shall be liable for taxes on 
all income derived from real or personal property located in the 
state, on all rents, dividends, and other income derived from real 
property located in the state, and on all capital gains derived from 
real or personal property located in the state.127 However, the po-
tential state tax liability of REIT shareholders is mitigated by sev-
eral factors. First, several states have provisions in their statutes 
giving a nonresident a credit for any taxes paid to his domiciliary 
state on income earned from property in those states.128 For example, 
suppose shareholder S lived in state Y and his REIT invested in 
property in state X. X would give a credit to S on his X state income 
tax return for any tax paid to state Y on income derived from prop-
erty in state X. Moreover, many of the states that have an income 
tax give their own residents credit for any taxes they have paid to 
another state on income derived from property located in that other 
state.129 
In addition, many state statutes declare that cash dividends shall 
be taxed only in the domiciliary state of a stockholder.130 Moreover, 
some statutes provide that dividends paid to nonresidents shall not be 
taxable in the state where the property that generated the dividends 
is located unless the property is used in a business, trade, or profes-
this policy statement as their own law, possibly because of such overly restrictive pro-
visions as the limitations on investments in land contracts, on unsecured borrowing, 
and on issuance of securities of more than one class. See Nelson, Regulation of REITs 
by the Midwest States in REAL EsrATE INVESI"MENT TRUsrs 95 (R. Needham ed. 1969). 
Of the member states, only Michigan has formally adopted this policy. 2 CCH BLUE 
SKY L. REP. 1)1) 25,638-52 (1972). Two nonmember states have also adopted the policy: 
Mississippi, id. 1) 25,641 (1964); Tennessee, 3 id. 1) 45,626 (1967). A number of other 
states, member and nonmember-Alaska, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Oregon, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia-although they have not officially 
adopted the Midwest Statement, nevertheless use it as a guide. Epstein, State Securities 
Regulation of Real Estate Invsetment Trusts, 23 U. FLA. L. R.Ev. 514, 521 (1971). 
127. E.g., CAL. REv. 8: TAX. CODE § 17071 (West 1970); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, 
§§ l!-302 to -307 (1971); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 62, § 5A (Supp. 1971); MICH. COMP. LAws 
ANN. § 206.101-24 (Supp. 1972); N.Y. TAX LAW § 632 (McKinney 1966); Omo REv. 
CoDE ANN. § 5747.20 (Page Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 7303, 7308 (Supp. 
1972). Contra, LA. REv. STAT • .ANN. § 47:53.3 (1970) (no tax due on dividends received 
from REITs since REITs are taxed directly on all income, see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 47:31 (1970)). 
128. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-128(b) (Supp. 1972); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 77-B:6 (1970) (reciprocity); WIS. STAT • .ANN. § 71.03(2) (1969). 
129. E.g., MAss • .ANN. LAws ch. 62, § 6(a) (1971); MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. § 206.255 
(Supp. 1972); N.Y. TAX LAw § 620 (McKinney 1966); Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 5747.05 
(Page Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7314 (Supp. 1972). 
130. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 3-301(2) (1971); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 206.113 
(Supp. 1972); N.Y. TAX LAw § 632 (McKinney 1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-05 
(1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2358 (Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 44-30-32 
(Supp. 1971); S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-279.1 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-14-68 (1963). 
832 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:808 
sion by the nonresident in that state.131 Presumably these statutes 
would exempt a nonresident REIT shareholder from paying taxes 
to these states on the REIT dividends. 
Finally, ·it is questionable whether a state could constitutionally 
tax a nonresident when his only connection with the state is his own-
ership of shares of a REIT which invests in that state. The United 
States Supreme Court has consistently held that a state may not tax 
a person unless it has jurisdiction over him.132 It has stated: "As to 
nonresidents, the jurisdiction [to tax] extends only to their property 
owned within the state and their business, trade or profession car-
ried on therein; and the tax is only on such income as is derived 
from these sources."133 In light of this language, it is not clear that 
a state would have jurisdiction over a nonresident shareholder of a 
REIT that owns property in the state. REIT property is owned by 
the REIT trustee134 and not by the shareholder. Moreover, the 
REIT's business within the state is carried on by the REIT trustee 
and not by the nonresident shareholder. Finally, the income that 
the shareholder receives is not earned directly from the property 
in the state, but indirectly in the form of dividends. 
_ International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Taxa-
tion,1315 however, lends support to the imposition of a tax on the 
dividends of a nonresident REIT shareholder, at least to the extent 
that such dividends are derived from property located in the taxing 
state. In that case the Supreme Court upheld a Wisconsin law186 that 
placed a tax on all dividends distributed by a foreign corporation to 
all of its stockholders, regardless of whether they were Wisconsi~ 
residents, in proportion to the income which the corporation earned 
within Wisconsin. Although this tax was collected from the corpo-
ration and not from its shareholders, the Court acknowledged that 
the incidence of the tax was in fact on the shareholders. Nevertheless, 
the Court stated: "A state may tax such part of the income of a non-
resident as is fairly attributable either to property located in the 
state or to events and transactions which, occurring there, are subject 
131. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1122 (Supp. 1970); HAWAII REv. LAWS § 235-27 
(1968); NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-2705 (1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15A-23 (Supp. 1971); 
N.Y. TAX LAW § 632 (McKinney 1964); R.I. GEN. LAws .ANN. § 44-30-32 (Supp. 1971); 
s.c. CODE ANN. § 65-279.1 (1962). Cf. Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-123(dd) (Supp. 1972), 
providing that a taxpayer may deduct dividends received from a corporation subject 
to tax in Arizona. "Corporation" includes a business trust. Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-
lOlG) (1956). 
132. American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965); Northwestern States Portland 
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 
435 (1940); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920). 
133. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 57 (1920). 
134. 3 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 65, § 43.11. 
135. 322 U.S. 435 (1944). 
136. Law of Sept. 26, 1935, ch. 505, § 3, [1935] Wis. Stat. 961. 
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to state regulation .... "137 However, the fact that no other state has 
attempted to tax corporate dividends distributed to nonresidents1~8 
seems to indicate that there is substantial doubt about the viability 
of the International Harvester decision. Even Wisconsin, after a long 
history of constitutional debate within the state, finally let its con-
troversial statute lapse in 1951.139 
Another avenue to taxation of nonresident REIT shareholders 
would be opened if the Court were to hold that REIT shares are 
interests in land, rather than intangibles like corporate stock. In 
1935, in Senior v. Braden,140 the Court did hold that business trust 
shares are interests in land. If this decision is still good law, a state 
with jurisdiction over a REIT's real estate could tax a nonresident 
shareholder on the portion of his REIT dividends attributable to 
that real property.141 However, Justice Stone, in a strong dissent in 
Senior, argued that business trust shares are no different from other 
intangibles and that the holder really has none of the incidents of 
legal ownership of the real estate that the shares represent.142 As one 
commentator has stated, it is impossible to guess how the Court 
would now resolve this issue.143 
B. Liability of REIT for State Corporate Income Taxes 
Among the states that have a corporate income tax the patterns 
of REIT taxation vary. Thirteen states directly incorporate the fed-
eral law and provide that those entities that qualify for REIT status 
under the Internal Revenue Code144 shall be taxed only on income 
that they have not distributed to shareholders.145 Six states partially 
137. 322 U.S. at 441-42. 
It could be argued on the basis of International Harvester that a state may tax 
dividends distributed to nonresident REIT shareholders and earned by the REIT 
from property located in the state. As in International Harvester, the state might have 
to collect the tax directly from the business rather than from its shareholders. First, 
it is possible that although the Court upheld a tax on the distribution of dividends to 
nonresident shareholders, it might not uphold a tax placed on the receipt of such 
dividends. Second, the administrative burden of assessing such a tax directly upon 
nonresident shareholders and of attempting to collect the assessments would likely 
prove overwhelming. 
lll8. At least no evidence has been found of any other state's attempting to do this. 
139. See Teschner, The Death of a Tax, 1953 Wis. L. REv. '76. 
140. 295 U.S. 422 (1935). 
141. See, e.g., Travis v. Yale &: Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920). 
142. 295 U.S. at 433-41. 
143. 3 G. BOGERT, supra note 45, § 308, at 629. 
144. !NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 856-58. 
145. CAL. REv. &: TAX. CoDE § 24413 (West Supp. 1972); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ lll8•1•58 (Supp. 1965); GA. CoDE ANN. § 92-3105 (1961); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 235-7l(d) 
(Supp. 1971); !LL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-203(d)(2)(D) (1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, 
§ 313A (1969); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 62, § 8(b)(l) (Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 290.09(28) (Supp. 1973); N.Y. TAX LAw § 209(5) (McKinney Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. 
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incorporate the federal law through a "piggyback" tax scheme. Un-
der this scheme, a business trust must pay the regular corporate 
income tax, but only on federal taxable income, which for a REIT 
is its undistributed income.146 Nine states provide that only those 
entities that are taxed as corporations by the federal government are 
liable for the corporate income tax,147 thus probably excluding the 
REIT. Five states apparently subject the REIT to corporate income 
tax on all of its taxable income derived from the state.148 
In the rest of the states, "corporations" are defined as corpora-
tions, joint stock companies, associations, and, in some states, insur-
ance companies.149 Whether a REIT would be considered an associ-
ation subject to this corporate tax is not clear. A few old cases held 
that business trusts were liable for the state corporate tax,150 but 
none was decided in a state whose current statute defines "corpora-
tion" in the manner described above. In the absence of a specific 
exemption, REITs would likely be considered associations subject 
to the state corporate income tax. This conclusion is supported by 
the fact that the wording of these statutes parallels the Internal Rev-
enue Code,151 under which business trusts have been considered as-
sociations subject to the federal corporation taxes.152 
STAT. § 105-130.12 (1972); Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 5733.040) (Page Supp. 1971); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2359 (Supp. 1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-223.1 (Supp. 1971). 
146. FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 220.03, .12 (1972); IDAHO CODE§§ 63-3006, -3022 (Supp. 1972); 
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 64-3203, -3210 (Supp. 1972); MONT. R.Ev. CODES ANN. §§ 84-1501, -1504 
(1966); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 77-2734 (Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LA.ws ANN. §§ 44-11-1, -11 
(1970). 
147. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 30, § 1901 (Supp. 1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-32.109 (Supp. 
1971); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 5102(6) (Supp. 1972); MICH. COMP. LA.ws ANN. 
§ 206.81(1) (Supp. 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15A-2 (Supp. 1971); ORE. R.Ev. STAT. 
§ 316.012 (1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5811 (1970); w. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-24-3 
(Supp. 1970) (however, an annual privilege tax may apply, W. VA. CoDE ANN.§§ 11-13-1 
to -25). A tenth state indirectly incorporates the federal law by stating that the income 
of a business trust shall be taxed as property held in trust-that is, taxed only on 
income which is not distributed to beneficiaries. ALA. CODE tit. 58, § 29(8) (Supp. 1971). 
148. ARIZ. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 43-101 (1956); LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 47:31 (1970) 
(states specifically that REITs are subject to corporate income tax on all income); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2701 (Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-13-1 (1963); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 226.14(10) (1957). 
149. ALAs. STAT. § 43.20.340 (1971); .ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-2002(5) (1960); CoNN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 12-213 (1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.32 (1971); Mo. REv. STAT. § 143.441 
(Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-01 (1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401 (Supp. 
1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-151.02(d) (Supp. 1972). In four of these states, however, even 
if a REIT is deemed a corporation, it will only pay state income tax on the income 
which it has not distributed to shareholders, for the tax is based on the entity's federal 
taxable income. ALAs. STAT. § 43.20.010 (1971); Mo. R.Ev. STAT. § 143.431 (Supp. 1973); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-01.1 (1972): VA. CODE ANN. § 58-151.032 (Supp. 1972). 
150. New York City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Graves, 272 N.Y. 1, 3 N.E.2d 612 
(1936); People ex rel. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Lynch, 265 N.Y. 593, 193 N.E. 335 (1934); 
Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. Oklahoma Tax Commr., 197 Okla. 114, 168 P.2d 607 (1946); 
Ellinger v. Tax Commn., 229 Wis. 71, 281 N.W. 701 (1938). 
151. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 770l(a)(3). 
152. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935); Helvering v. Combs, 
296 U.S. 365 (1935). · 
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C. Liability of REIT for State Corporate Franchise Taxes 
In addition to corporate income taxes, many states have corporate 
franchise or excise taxes based on the value of the corporation's 
capital stock; again, it is unclear whether REITs are subject to these 
taxes. Three states specifically state that business trusts are liable for 
these taxes,153 while two states indirectly impose these taxes on busi-
ness trusts.154 Most states, however, do not explicitly address this 
problem: several states do not define "corporations" in their corpo-
ration franchise tax statutes but nevertheless talk in terms of articles 
of incorporation or incorporated entities, thus seemingly excluding 
REITs from such taxation;155 several others define "corporations" as 
all corporations, joint stock companies, associations, or other business 
organizations that have privileges, powers, rights, or immunities not 
possessed by individuals;156 one state declares that an entity must 
pay the corporation franchise taxes if it pays corporate income 
tax to the state.157 
VI. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF TAXATION AND FACTORS 
RELEVANT TO A STATE'S CHOICE OF METHOD 
In addition to the methods of REIT income taxation described 
above, at least two other possible methods might be employed. First, 
in that REITs perform many of the same functions as banks and 
other financial institutions-particularly lending money for invest-
ment in real estate with the loans secured by mortgages-the state 
could tax REITs in the same manner that it taxes such financial 
institutions. Second, since REITs are similar in certain respects to 
mutual funds,158 a state, if it has a special tax scheme for mutual 
funds, could extend this scheme to cover REITs. 
153. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:IOA-4 (Supp. 1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 1201 
(1966); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2902 (Supp. 1972). 
154. WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN. §§ 23.90.040, 23A.40.060 (Supp. 1972) (business trusts 
are liable for all taxes which corporations must pay); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-12-78, 
11-12-80, 47-9A-5 (1966) (business trusts are liable for all corporate license fees and 
taxes). 
155. Au... CODE, tit. 51, §§ 347-51 (Supp. 1971); .ARK. STAT, ANN. § 84-1833 (1960); 
CoLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-10-6, -7 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 501 (Supp. 1970); 
ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.131, .138 (1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7501 (Supp. 1972); 
KY. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 136.070 (Supp. 1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 147.010 (Supp. 1971); 
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-303, -306 (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-122 (1972); ORE. REV. 
STAT. §§ 57.767, .769 (1971); R.I. GEN. LA.ws ANN. § 44-12-1 (1970); TEX. TAX-GEN. art. 
12.01 (1969); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-46 (1965). 
156. LA.. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:601 to :616 (1970); Miss. CoDE ANN. §§ 9313-14 (Supp. 
1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-13-1 (Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7602 (Supp. 
1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-456 (1969). 
157. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-606 (Supp. 1971). Theoretically, then, a REIT which dis-
tributes one hundred per cent of its income should not be liable for this corporate 
franchise tax since by S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-223.1 (Supp. 1971) a REIT need not pay 
any income tax on income which it pays to its shareholders. 
158. Both RElTs and mutual funds provide a pooling arrangement, with beneficial 
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The number of factors that a state must consider in deciding 
which tax plan to adopt makes such a decision extremely complex. 
No one plan is best suited for all states, nor can a recommendation 
be made to any particular state without knowing all the facts that 
prevail in that state. The complexity of the problem can best be 
demonstrated by the following example. It might appear that if a 
state strongly desires an inflow of capital investment, it could ac-
complish this result by setting low rates of taxation on REIT in-
come. Yet the solution is not so simple. In addition to the state's 
low income tax rates, the REIT trustees will compare the real prop-
erty taxes, real estate transfer taxes, payroll taxes, and mortgage 
transfer taxes of the state to those of other states to determine where 
investment would be most advantageous. The trustees will also com-
pare the expected rate of return on invested capital in the state 
·with that in other states. If the REIT is of the equity variety, con-
sideration will be given to the availability of qualified independent 
contractors in the area who can manage the trust's properties.1119 
Therefore, a low tax rate on REIT income will not necessarily en-
sure a large flow of capital investment into the state. 
It might also seem that if a state is in need of tax revenue, it 
should not tax REIT income at a relatively low rate. However, in-
sofar as the tax rate does influence the inflow of capital, a high rate 
might in some circumstances deter REITs from investing in the 
state, resulting in a smaller base of aggregate REIT income subject 
to the state's taxation and thus a smaller amount of total tax reve-
nue derived from REITs than if REITs were taxed at a relatively 
low rate. Furthermore, to the extent that REIT investment has a 
multiplier effect on a state's economic activity, a tax rate so high that 
it deters REIT investment may have a retarding effect on total in-
come and thus on total tax revenue generated in the state. There-
fore, the factors that must be considered by a state in devising a 
scheme for taxing REIT income are so numerous and complex that 
a generalized solution cannot be formulated. 
Many of the same complex factors are involved in constructing a 
scheme for taxing REIT shareholders on income derived from prop-
erty in the taxing state. For example, whether a low tax rate on 
REIT shareholders would stimulate the inflow of capital investment 
will generally depend on the factors surveyed above.160 Thus, again, 
a generalized solution is not possible. 
interests represented by transferable certificates, for small investors who could not 
otherwise obtain the diversification of assets or expert management for their capital 
that these entities offer. See H.R. REP. No. 2020, supra note 25, at ll-4. 
159. See note 80 supra and accompanying text. 
160. The tax rate on REIT shareholders will likely have the same effect on a REIT 
trustee's investment decisions as the tax rate on REIT income since the goal of the 
REIT is to maximize its shareholders' income. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that in the twelve years since the passage of the 
Real Estate Investment Trust Act, little or nothing has been done 
on the state level to clarify what tax, tort, and contract liabilities the 
REIT, its trustees, and its shareholders might face. The law on busi-
ness trusts still varies widely among the states. While in some states 
the law on the liabilities of business trust trustees and shareholders is 
favorable, in others there is no law on the subject or the law is un-
certain. Still other states would treat REIT trustees and sharehold-
ers unfavorably by subjecting them to liabilities that would not be 
imposed on the officers and shareholders of a corporation. These 
variations in state law on business trusts may create uncertainty for 
potential investors and thus hinder investment in REITs. 
Therefore, it has been argued that in order to provide uniformity 
in the law and to treat like entities alike, a state's law on REITs 
should parallel its corporations law. To equalize treatment of cor-
porate and REIT creditors, trustees should be liable for REIT debts 
and torts, but only to the limit of the value of the REIT's assets. 
With respect to state taxation of REITs and their shareholders, no 
definite conclusion can be reached; each state, on the basis of numer-
ous complex factors, must choose the plan that best fits its own needs 
and desires. 
Regardless of what plan is actually adopted, however, it is obvi-
ous that all states must clarify their laws on REITs. Until then a 
potential investor or trustee cannot be certain of the liabilities he 
may be undertaking. 
